Conservative Iranian

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Why the West Does Not Survive Without Iran

چرا غرب بدون ایران نابود می شود؟ | گفتگو با عباس سوری

SpeakerAbbas Suri & Benjamin Suri @Parsi_Live
LanguageFarsi, translated to English
Full lectureWatch on YouTube
Excerpted here12 clips, 1,430 words

Abbas Suri and Benjamin Suri take up the question their title asks directly: why the West does not survive without Iran. Twelve passages carry it, nine minutes drawn from a fifty-four minute conversation with three gaps of more than eight minutes. What follows describes those twelve and makes no claim about the forty-five minutes not excerpted.

Their case runs through Islam and the left. Any civilization that meets Islam either absorbs it or is absorbed by it, they argue, and Iranians are the only people who have managed the former. That makes Iran the precedent for the question they see Europe facing: whether a European narrative of Islam emerges, or Europe reshapes itself around Islam. The middle of the argument explains why the Iranian case went wrong at home. A religion held as private faith is one thing; the same religion built into a political structure and handed to the left is another. They trace that second version through Ali Shariati, whose leftist reading of Islam set the inherited tradition aside, and they hold that religion fused with the left had no precedent before Iran. Liberation theology was forming in Latin America on the same timeline; the notes below take that up.

Two claims carry more weight than the rest, and both are theirs rather than settled. Jimmy Carter, they say, handed religious authority from the right to the left. They also cite a warning they attribute to Mohammad Reza Shah, that if Iran is lost the West is lost; his documented remarks run to Western dependence on Iranian energy rather than to that epigram.

The closing passages turn to what remains: Seyyed Javad Tabatabai's four foundations of Iranian identity, and whether a society that has moved past religion has now turned against it.

0:14

National Identity

Iranians are the only people who absorbed Islam rather than being absorbed by it.

0:14 to 0:25 Watch in the full lecture

The choice, as they put it, is stark: either Islam absorbs Europe and America, or Europe and America absorb Islam. Abbas Suri and Benjamin Suri argue Iranians are the only people who have ever done the absorbing successfully, which is why they treat Iran as the case the West should study.

Read the transcript

Either Islam is going to absorb Europe and America, or Europe and America must absorb Islam. And the only people who have done that successfully are Iranians.

0:53

Authority and the State

In this account, Carter handed religion from the right to the left and the West still pays.

0:53 to 1:23 Watch in the full lecture

Abbas Suri and Benjamin Suri argue Jimmy Carter handed religious authority from the right to the left with both hands, and that Europe and the West are still living inside the consequences. They cite a warning they attribute to Mohammad Reza Shah, that if Iran is lost the West is lost, though that epigram is not attested in his own documented remarks.

Read the transcript

And the West is now paying the price for that loss. When Mohammad Reza Shah said that if Iran is lost, the West is lost? The West is lost, severely, Mohammad Reza Shah had understood the issue correctly. Because this sword that contemporary thinkers say hangs over the European Union and the West goes back to that issue. In reality, Carter handed religion from the right to the left with both hands.

3:19

Authority and the State

A personal faith turned into a political structure and handed to the left can become destructive.

3:19 to 3:50 Watch in the full lecture

There is a difference between a religion held as personal faith and the same religion built into a political structure. Abbas Suri and Benjamin Suri argue the second version can become destructive, especially once the left takes hold of it, and they trace the damage from works of art outward.

Read the transcript

when Islam, as a personal religion, transforms into a political structure and especially ends up in the hands of the left, it can become extremely destructive. In reality, the entire structure of everything that is a modern achievement of humanity is, in a sense, through this movement of the left, as we can see, severely damaged, from works of art to various other areas, it can leave a very bad legacy. So in fact,

5:22

Tradition and Human Nature

Either a European narrative of Islam emerges or Europe becomes Islamic.

5:22 to 5:53 Watch in the full lecture

Europe faces a stark alternative in their reading: either a European narrative of Islam emerges, or Europe becomes Islamic. Abbas Suri and Benjamin Suri point to Iranian Islam as the precedent, a faith that settled into an existing cultural framework rather than replacing it.

Read the transcript

if we don't offer a European Islam, Europe will become Islamic. That is, the dilemma is: either a European narrative of Islam must emerge, or Europe will become Islamic. In fact, you should know that what we did with Islam as Iranians, we have an Iranian Islam, meaning an Islam that came and settled into the framework of our cultural structure.

And within that space it moved forward. Now today I am working a lot on this topic as well, specifically from this angle: what contribution can the Iranian world make to the West, because the Iranian world has certain markers,

9:00

The Iranian Condition

The Shah liberalized the economy while Iranian society stayed religious and leaned left.

9:00 to 9:49 Watch in the full lecture

The mismatch is stranger than the simple version allows: a ruler pushing economic liberalism, free enterprise and Iranian industry, over a society that was genuinely religious and still leaned left. Abbas Suri and Benjamin Suri argue that understanding it explains more about what came next.

Read the transcript

Look, if I want to take a historical view, let's say around 1970, or 1350 in our own calendar, Iran was a society with a mass public. Iran, right? Mohammad Reza Shah was, so to speak, a liberal who was trying to lead society while respecting religious customs and rituals, but was strongly, so to speak, in favor of liberalism in the economic sphere, and strongly encouraged a free economy, strongly encouraged Iranian entrepreneurs to build factories, whose benefits are clearly visible now, and we should revisit them. But Iranian society itself was a religious society, yet it leaned left.

10:20

Tradition and Human Nature

Shariati's leftist reading of Islam set the inherited faith aside to serve a political project.

10:20 to 11:15 Watch in the full lecture

Ali Shariati reinterpreted Islam through a leftist narrative, Abbas Suri and Benjamin Suri argue, putting the inherited past aside to serve a political project. Islam as a moral discipline for the inner life was no use for that, so it went, and Iran became a religious leftist society.

Read the transcript

When Shariati is presenting a leftist reading of Islam, meaning when he is interpreting Islam through a leftist narrative, he tries to take everything that exists from the past, from Islam, and give it a new interpretation. In doing so he wants to set aside the past and redefine it, and the thinkers of that era, the narrative they offer of Islam, is a reformed and different Islam that wants to accomplish certain things.

The narrative of Islam you hold as a religion, as a morality-centered faith meant to cultivate your inner life, that narrative is not a very useful vehicle for that purpose, and it is set aside. So now you have a religious leftist society. I want to emphasize: the combination of religion alongside the left had no precedent in the world before that. Who is the father of the left,

19:43

The Iranian Condition

Iran became the first religious left society in 1979, on this account, and is no longer one.

19:43 to 20:22 Watch in the full lecture

Abbas Suri and Benjamin Suri argue that in 1979 Iran became the first religious left society, the place where the left claimed religion as its own, though a comparable fusion was taking shape in Latin America on the same timeline. They add that Iranian society is nothing of the kind today, which puts it once again at the edge of what the rest of the world is about to meet.

Read the transcript

that the West is now confronting is the identity of political Islam. In fact, we went through all of this to explain why Iranian society in practice matters so much to the world and so much to the West. Because at the time the 1979 revolution happened, Iran effectively became the first religious left society.

That is, in fact, the place where the left claimed religion as its own was Iran. Now of course, Iranian society today is in no way a religious left society. Meaning right now, again, Iranian society is at the edge of events that humanity is experiencing. We will get to that.

22:12

Spontaneous Order

A conservative puts inherited practice first and abstract reason second, and the left reverses it.

22:12 to 23:19 Watch in the full lecture

Abbas Suri and Benjamin Suri put it plainly: a conservative trusts what has been handed down, because ancestors practiced it and time has proven it, and puts abstract reason second. The left reverses that order and asks one universal reason to decide everything, down to whether an evening with your parents is worth it.

Read the transcript

Absolutely. Let me also see if I can give a definition of what the right-wing view of society says. A so-called conservative society believes that tradition, and what has been passed down to me, must have served a purpose. It has worked over the long term, and has proven its effectiveness, because my ancestors practiced it.

And so, for this reason, it places abstract reason, meaning the kind of reason that, for example, works in Iran, works in France, works in America, in second place. The left, on the other hand, sees this in a universalist way, so to speak. They say a universal, all-encompassing reason must come first and decide, for example, what benefit is there in, say, going to visit my parents in the evening, going for a visit, going to spend time with them, doing something for them.

Or, for example, what is the benefit of learning the Shahnameh? What we see, for example, in Shamlou, what we see in many leftists who wrote novels and expressed political opinions.

23:26

Tradition and Human Nature

Universalism has no respect for the local, which is why the left cannot tolerate nationality.

23:26 to 24:10 Watch in the full lecture

Nationality, patriotism, history, religion: Abbas Suri and Benjamin Suri argue the left treats all of it as material to be swept aside in favor of one uniform global standard with no respect for the local. It will not tolerate nationality, they say, yet it does make room for identity-based difference.

Read the transcript

that has come to sweep aside everything that humans carry from the past. Whether it is nationality, patriotism, history, religion, any matter that a person carries with them. Being universal is something the left cares about. It is about founding a single global society, a uniform one, where morality, if it exists at all, now in the postmodern version some things have been added, but this universalism, this global reach, matters to it.

It has no respect for the local. That is why it does not tolerate nationality or nationalism. And yet it does tolerate identity-based difference. Now this is something that has been added to it more recently.

36:51

National Identity

Iranian identity rests on four foundations, and the Islamic Republic stood the country on one leg.

36:51 to 38:25 Watch in the full lecture

Seyyed Javad Tabatabai's four foundations, as Abbas Suri and Benjamin Suri relay them: ancient Iran, modernity from the Constitutional Revolution, what came from Greece and the West, and Islam. No one foundation may outweigh the rest, they argue, because you cannot stand a table on one leg, an image of theirs rather than his.

Read the transcript

Let me point out again that "post-religious" does not mean anti-religious or atheist. It actually means a society whose central pillar is not religion. That is the real issue. Exactly. Look, when Dr. Javad Toai speaks, he says Iranian society has four foundations, meaning the ancient world, which is what we now know as the cultural world of ancient Iran, with its Zoroastrian markers.

Then there is what he calls modernity, which he says began with the Constitutional Revolution, and Iranians wanted development, and Iranians still want development, and they want to be connected to the world. Then there is the element of what we received from nearby, or what came in from Greece, which cannot be denied and which you all need to keep in mind.

When he defines these different foundations, these four foundations, and defines the fourth one as, in his terms, what came to us from the Arabian Peninsula, Islam, he says none of these four foundations can be stronger than the others, because you cannot build a table on one leg. And that is exactly what the Islamic Republic effectively did: it placed the entire country on a single leg.

And Iranians want to restore the other foundations to their place, they want to be connected to the world, they want Iran to be the priority in reality, and the world it had. And the idea of these four foundations can create stability. When these four foundations return, it will also have an impact on other countries. Although I see Iran in the future in a much better position than,

49:17

Authority and the State

Sabeti says he asked for a free hand, the Shah refused, and history now turns toward the Shah.

49:17 to 50:00 Watch in the full lecture

Abbas Suri and Benjamin Suri surface a detail many have never heard: by Parviz Sabeti's own account he proposed moving far more aggressively against the opposition, and Mohammad Reza Shah refused. They argue that refusal is why Iranian history is turning toward the Shah now, and that defeat is not always failure.

Read the transcript

since all of our lives are limited, sometimes defeats can increase your standing. Many people may wonder why Mohammad Reza Shah didn't hold onto power, why he didn't do more, why he didn't arrest more people, why he didn't, for example, give Parviz Sabeti a free hand with the proposal Sabeti put forward. He even said in America that he proposed to the Shah, "Let me handle this matter, let me wrap it up," and the Shah didn't allow it.

In any case, whatever is said, if with this approach he had not accepted it and had gone into exile, the spotlight of Iranian history would not be turning toward him now. I emphasize: defeat is not always bad, and in this sense, quite possibly,

50:04

National Identity

Iran may have moved from post-religious to anti-religious, and sacred legitimacy may be closed for good.

50:04 to 50:53 Watch in the full lecture

There is a real difference between a society that has moved past religion and one that has turned against it. Abbas Suri and Benjamin Suri argue Iran may have crossed from the first into the second, and that the door may now be closed for good on any sacred legitimacy.

Read the transcript

and you keep resisting until the last moment, then maybe we can no longer call Iran post-religious. We might call Iran anti-religious. Meaning maybe right now you exist at a point where, even though people's anger is far greater than what these words can capture, given everything that has happened, perhaps the door has been closed for good on any sacred legitimacy.

I want to emphasize this, just as for decades people were always invited, if you have a problem with the Islamic Republic, this was said repeatedly by the first person of this country: if you have a problem with the Islamic Republic, at least for the sake of Iran, come to the ballot boxes. Now we emphasize: if you love Islam, then not just for Iran's sake, but certainly come. This is the definition,

Books and Thinkers Referenced

Abbas Suri and Benjamin Suri draw on the following thinkers and works across this lecture. Only one work is named aloud, so this is mostly a list of figures. Descriptions are ours, offered as a starting point for readers new to them.

Shahnameh by Ferdowsi (1010): The Iranian book of kings, begun in 977 and finished in March 1010, running to some fifty thousand couplets and carrying Iran from its legendary beginnings to the Arab conquest. Ferdowsi lived from about 940 to 1020. Clip 11 reaches for it as an example of something a universal reason cannot price: asked what the benefit of learning the Shahnameh is, the question has no answer in those terms.

Ali Shariati: Iranian sociologist and revolutionary, 1933 to 1977, whose lectures at the Hosseiniyeh Ershad in Tehran from 1968 onward recast Shia Islam in revolutionary terms and reached an enormous audience across every social class. He studied in Paris, absorbed Sartre, Fanon and Marxist sociology, and named his own position Red Shiism against what he called Safavid Shiism. He was imprisoned in 1973, released in 1975, and died in Southampton in June 1977. The speakers treat his reading as the point where the inherited faith was set aside and rewritten to serve a political project, and they hold that religion fused with the left had no precedent anywhere before Iran. That last claim is theirs and it is contestable. Gustavo Gutierrez gave the founding lecture of liberation theology in Chimbote, Peru, in July 1968, months before Shariati's first Hosseiniyeh Ershad lecture that October, which points to two independent fusions of religion and the left emerging at once rather than one Iranian first. The speakers' claim is stronger read as being about a religious left that captured a state, which liberation theology never did, though they do not put it that way. Two further qualifications are worth carrying: Shariati was sharply anti-clerical, and his thought did not become the foundation of the republic that followed him.

Seyyed Javad Tabatabai: Iranian political philosopher, 1945 to 2023, who wrote extensively on Iranian political thought and its encounter with Greek philosophy. The speakers relay a four-foundations account of Iranian identity from his spoken remarks and say no foundation may outweigh the others. His own published framework is close but not identical. In a 2014 interview he describes four coordinate elements, Iranian-ness, Islam, the Greek rational inheritance and modernity, joined in the image of a great river fed by four tributaries, and he faults both Reza Shah and the Islamic Republic for collapsing the four into one. The speakers name only the Islamic Republic. Three details in their version are not attested in any source we could locate: the table that cannot stand on one leg, which is their image and not his, since his is a river throughout; Islam described as arriving from the Arabian Peninsula; and ancient Iran with Zoroastrian markers, where his own term is the broader Iranian-ness. The Greek and Western inheritance, which is the element most easily mistaken for a flourish, is the best attested of the four and runs through his 2002 article on the misreading of civilizations and his book on the decline of political thought in Iran.

Mohammad Reza Shah: Last ruler of Iran, 1919 to 1980, on the throne from 1941 until the revolution of 1979. Clip 6 credits him with pushing economic liberalism, a free economy and Iranian industrial enterprise while society itself leaned left, and clip 15 with refusing a harder crackdown. The speakers also cite a warning they attribute to him, that if Iran is lost the West is lost. The epigram itself traces only to uncited commentary. His documented public remarks, including a 1978 press conference, run instead to Western dependence on Iranian energy, which is the same argument in less quotable form.

Jimmy Carter: President of the United States from 1977 to 1981, 1924 to 2024, in office through the Iranian revolution. The speakers say he handed religious authority from the right to the left with both hands. That is their reading of American conduct during the revolution rather than a statement or policy of his, and the clip offers no further specifics.

Parviz Sabeti: Former senior official of SAVAK, the Shah's security service, where he ran domestic security. He is living. By his own later account he proposed arresting roughly fifteen hundred opposition figures in mid-1978 and the Shah approved three hundred, which is the refusal clip 15 turns on. The account is his own, repeated in later compilations but not corroborated by other officials, and at least one critical review treats his self-portrayal with suspicion. The clips carry his claim, not a settled finding.

Ahmad Shamlou: Iranian poet, 1925 to 2000, widely held to be the most influential figure in modern Iranian poetry and the writer who carried free verse into it. He supported the Communist Party, was jailed for fourteen months in 1954, wrote fiction, plays and screenplays alongside sixteen volumes of poetry, and compiled the thirteen-volume Ketab-e Kouche on Iranian folklore and street language. Clip 11 names him among leftist writers whose politics reached their work.

About this page

These clips are excerpted from a longer lecture in Farsi by Abbas Suri & Benjamin Suri and translated into English by The Conservative Iranian. The transcripts on this page are our translation and not the speaker's own words in English, and any error in them is ours. Which passages became clips is an editorial decision of ours, not the shape of the lecture itself. Where two clips overlap, each one is published in full, so a sentence you meet twice is intentional and every argument stands on its own.

Watch the complete lecture on Abbas Suri & Benjamin Suri's channel, @Parsi_Live. If you found this useful, the best thing you can do is subscribe to them there.

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